What conditions would make a war just?
Posted By Sophocles on November 23, 2009
One of the most perplexingly difficult issues in regards to the possible acceptability of war is the complex reasoning found in the body of theory about the ‘just-war’. What this theory provides is arguments that a war is just if that a nation or other entity resorts to war only for just causes, provided it has a prima facie just cause to defend its territory and citizens against armed attacks.[1] This has been the moral principle that has been put forward in contemporary debates that were originally developed by theological figures. In the fifth century, St Augustine discussed in City of God the circumstances under which killing could be justified and empires legitimately expanded.[2] In the thirteenth century, St Thomas Aquinas laid out a more elaborate just war doctrine in his Summa Theolgica. He wrote that three conditions were necessary to make a war just: it must be ordered by a competent authority; the cause must be just; and the combatants must have ‘a right intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil’.[3]
More modern just war principles involve both the decision to go to war, known as jus ad bellum, and how to fight one, known as just in bello. More recent just war theorists, such as Peter Temes and Richard Regan, often assume that the requirement of just cause is applicable only to the initial resort to war, and that once the war has begun, it matters less how it is conducted.[4] However, it may be argued that this statement is not as inclusive as it should be since it is possible that a just cause can arise during the course of fighting. Therefore, it may be asserted that a just cause is a necessity for engaging in war. Evidently, a just cause may specify the ends for which it is permissible to engage in a just war, or further, that it is permissible to pursue by means of war.
In approaching the conditions that make a just war, this essay shall first outline and discuss the principles or proportionality that St Thomas Aquinas outlined for the justification of war. It will then provide empirical examples to explain the concepts of double effect. Thirdly, it will then examine the justification to wage war, such as the action of rescuing nationals. Finally, it will briefly discuss the theory of wars of choice.
A just cause for war may be justified by the principle of proportionality. When human agents consciously will to do something, they are morally responsible for the foreseeable consequences of their actions. Their actions can have several effects, for one of which they are morally permitted to strive, and for the other of which they are not.[5] St Thomas Aquinas supports this theory by claiming that when human agents consciously will to do something, ‘they are morally responsible for the foreseeable consequences of their actions, and their actions can have several effects, for one of which they are morally permitted to strive, and for the other of which they are not’.[6] Proportionality is therefore subsumed under the principle of double effect, which holds that human agents are morally permitted to act in such cases if and only if certain conditions are satisfied.[7] The important factor is not the side-effect, but the effect at which the agent aims.[8]What adds substance to the justifiability of the actions of war is that it embraces that human agents are morally permitted to act in such cases only if certain conditions are satisfied.[9] First, the action itself should be morally neutral and not morally bad. Therefore, the principle of double effect cannot be invoked to justify acts or murder or adultery. Secondly, the human agent should pursue to desire the morally good effect, that is as Regan emphasised it, ‘the effect that is not morally good to strive for’.[10] What follows is that the morally bad effect must not be the means whereby the morally good effect is achieved from.[11] This may be evident in the example of deliberately killing an innocent individual in order to save one’s own, or another individual’s life. Finally, in order for double effect to justify the reasons of going to war, the morally good effect which is permissible to desire, should equal or outweigh the morally bad effect. This is the principle of proportionality.[12]
What is necessary is an example that is able to provide evidence on how the principles of double effect and proportionality may satisfy the justifications of just war theory. Bombing military targets will, in addition to destroying the target aimed at, almost inevitably result in the death of ‘enemy’ civilians who are not participants in war or war-related activities. [13]This bombing would satisfy the first element of double effect, since it is morally permissible to bomb military targets in a just war. The bombing would evidently satisfy the second condition if the military ‘personnel responsible for the bombing desire the destruction of military targets without desiring the death of innocent civilians’. [14] In addition, the third condition would be satisfied only if the ‘collateral death of ordinary civilians is not the means whereby the military targets are destroyed’.[15] However, what academics such as Richard Regan and Oliver O’Donovan argue is that the fourth element of proportionality is the most morally difficult to satisfy. It is argued that the fourth condition will only be satisfied and morally permissible only if the importance of the military targets equal or outweigh the resulting deaths of ordinary civilians.[16]
The decision to wage war will be justified only if the wrong to be prevented or rectified equals or surpasses the reasonably anticipated human and material costs of the war. Due proportion involves three elements. First, there is a value judgement about the worth of the cause that purports to justify recourse to war.[17] Second, there is an accurate judgment about the causalities and costs of the war.[18] Thirdly, there is a ‘value judgement about the proportional worth of the war’s cause in relation to its likely casualties and costs’. [19] What can also be argued is that judgements about what the causes of the war are worth, are subjective insofar as the human subjects making them have values that influence their evaluations.[20] However, these judgements have an objective reference; ‘the cause’s real worth in the scale of human values’.[21] Further, in relations to the accurate judgements about the casualties and costs of the war, these costs and fatalities will involve hypothetical projections of the war’s likely course, and the estimates have no higher probability than the prospect of the war’s projected course. Although, academic Richard Regan argues that experts often come to different conclusion about the likely course of a war. Additionally, he argues that the values and attitudes of these experts undoubtedly incline them to promote both an optimistic or pessimistic argument in regards to the war’s course, and so minimise and maximise its potential casualties and costs.[22] Nonetheless, this argument establishes that the estimates have an objective orientation, and that being the empirical context of the contemplated war. Finally, the third element provides a comparison between the value of a war’s cause to its likely casualties and costs, and to judge whether or not there is due proportion between them. Arguably, academics claim that it is not enough ‘for reason to estimate in absolute terms the war’s likely casualties and costs; if to the cause, no war could be justified’.[23] These comparative judgements also provide an objective argument; this argument involves the real significance of the contemplated cause of the war, and the empirical evidence and logic supporting estimates of the anticipated casualties and costs. Evidently, what could be concluded is that despite the indemonstrable values and the factual uncertainties involved, it is the function of practical reason to make such judgments, and statements need to make these judgments if they are to ascertain that they have a proportionate just cause to wage war. [24]
Further, what one may consider as a justification to wage war, may be the actions of rescuing nationals. This is as a result of nations having a just cause to mount military expeditions to rescue nationals seized by foreign governments or surrogates.[25] What may seem contrary to reason and international law to detain foreign nationals in order to obtain political policy concessions, it is an action that has been evident in recent years in countries such as Iran. However, what one must keep in mind is that the actions of proposing a war for this sole reason, can only be justified if the rescuing nation has moral certainty, ‘practical certainty excluding reasonable doubt,’[26] that foreign governments are supporting the intention of detaining nationals. In addition, the nation that has the nationals held hostage will not obtain the expeditious release of the nationals, and therefore the rescuing nation needs to have probable cause to believe that the attempt to release or recapture their nationals will be successful. This creates more moral certainty as to the justification of retrieving those individuals.[27] However, as stated, the task must be successful with no nationals dead, such as if an attempt is prematurely discovered or if the task itself fails.[28] In the case of nationals being murdered for a political purpose, the wronged nation has, according to Regan, hardly any moral right to take offensive military action to punish the guilty nation. Just-war theorists such as Alfred Vanderpol, once recognised the justice of individual nations using martial forces to punish guilty nations of their committed wrongs and to vindicate international law.[29] However, this is no longer the case since article 2.4 and 51 of the United Nations Charter recognises the rights of individual nations using military force only in individual or collective self-defence.[30] Further, under article 42, the Security Council has the obligatory right to punish guilty nations in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.[31] Therefore, what may be evident in justifying a war in rescuing nationals is that there must be a moral certainty that a foreign government is responsible for holding nationals, and there must be a probable cause to believe that the release attempt will be successful.
One may ask whether wars of choice can be justifiable? The academic Richard Haass defines wars of choice as wars that tend to involve less than vital interests and the existence of alternative policies, such as in the cases of wars in Vietnam, Kosovo and Bosnia.[32] Therefore, empirically, it may be argued that these wars may be justified when using force is seen as the best available policy option. The perspective that could be brought forward by academics such as Haass is that if war is the best option, ‘it should be strong enough to garner considerable domestic and international support’.[33] Critically, this statement supports the opinion that by using military force, more good is accomplished for more people at ‘a lower cost than diplomacy, sanctions or inaction’.[34] By this standard, Haass provides analysis on the second Iraq War, stating that it was not justifiable since the United States could have done more to contain Saddam though strengthening sanctions. Further, it was evident through the United Nations that there was a lack of international support, noticeable even before the war began. It was argued that it ‘could have been known that the likely costs would be great’ and the accomplishments modest.[35]
The just war theory has provided dialogue on how a war may have just causes. However, the double effect principle, which provides reason as to the moral permissibility of war, allows for this issue to be explored through the notion of proportionality. It may seem difficult to the point of unrealistic to suppose that a ’separation of both the good and bad expected effects of war into two categories and compare the expected effects in one category only with the expected effects in the corresponding category’. [36] In addition, the empirically focused notion of the justifiability of a just war involving the saving of fellow nationals provided additional pertinent reasons as to why a war may have just causes. Finally, the issue of war of choice was examined, and this provided another plausible reason as to why military force may be justified in wars.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Brook, Y and Epstein, A, ‘Just War Theory vs. American Self-Defence’, The Objective Standard: A Journal of Culture and Politics, vol. 1, no. 1, 2006, pp. 1-29.
Haass, R, ‘When is War Justifiable?’, Council of Foreign Relations, May 2009, pp. 1-2.
McMahan, J, ‘Just Case for War’, in T Brooks (eds.), The Global Justice Reader, Blackwell Publishing, United Kingdom, Oxford, 2008, pp. 511-532.
O’Donovan, O, The Just War Revisited, 1st edn, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003.
Regan, Richard, Just War: Principles and Cases, 1st edn, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, 1996.
Schott, R, ‘Just War and the Problem of Evil’, Hypatia, vol. 23, no, 2, 2008, pp. 122-140.
Scruton, R, Dictionary of Political Thought, 3rd edn, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007.
Temes, P, The Just War, 1st edn, Ivan R. Dee Publisher, Chicago 2003.
‘United Nations Charter, Ch VII’, in T Brooks (eds.), The Global Justice Reader, Blackwell Publishing, United Kingdom, Oxford, 2008.
Vanderpol, A, La doctrine scholastique du droit de guerre, Pedone, Paris, 1919.
[1] R Schott, ‘Just War and the Problem of Evil’, Hypatia, vol. 23, no. 2, 2008, pp. 122.
[2] R Haass, ‘When is War Justifiable?’, Council of Foreign Relations, May 2009, p. 1.
[3] Ibid.
[4] P Temes, The Just War, Ivan R. Dee Publisher, Chicago, 2003, p. 166.
[5] R Regan, Just War: Principles and Cases, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, 1996, p. 95.
[6] Ibid., p. 96.
[7] Ibid.
[8] R Scruton, Dictionary of Political Thought, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007, p. 191.
[9] Regan, op. cit., p. 96.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] McMahan, J, ‘Just Case for War’, in T Brooks (eds.), The Global Justice Reader, Blackwell Publishing, United Kingdom, Oxford, 2008, pp. 525.
[14] Regan, op. cit., p. 92.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid., p. 62.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid., p. 63.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
[23] McMahan, J, ‘Just Case for War’, in T Brooks (eds.), The Global Justice Reader, Blackwell Publishing, United Kingdom, Oxford, 2008, pp. 525.
[24] Regan, loc. cit.
[25] Ibid., p. 52.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.
[29] A Vanderpol, La doctrine scholastique du droit de guerre, Pedone, Paris, 1919, p. 32.
[30] ‘United Nations Charter, Ch VII’ , in T Brooks (eds.), The Global Justice Reader, Blackwell Publishing, United Kingdom, Oxford, 2008, p. 487.
[31] Ibid., p. 485.
[32] Haass, loc. cit.
[33] Ibid., p. 2.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.
[36] McMahan, op. cit., p. 526.
By Sophocles Kitharidis
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Hello Sophocles,
What a big question – when is war just! Just as St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Augustine pondered it in earlier times, we still ponder on the question today. No doubt it is necessary in some circumstances, human nature being what it is, but what determines a just war is debatable. History tells us authorities can make a plausible cause which they say is just with horrendous results.
I will have to delve into “The City of God” now that you have sparked up my interest.
Many thanks, Gabrielle.